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Abstract 
Security policies are required that protect information from unauthorised access, and 
also respect challenges users face in creating, and particularly managing, increasing 
numbers of passwords. This paper investigates real password use in the context of 
daily life. It presents the results of an empirical study where participants completed a 
password diary over seven days, followed by debrief interviews to gain further 
knowledge and understanding of user behaviour. The results reported relate to how 
many passwords are in use, the types of passwords participants created, the 
relationships between different passwords and to sensitive services, how participants 
retrieved their passwords and finally, the different strategies adopted by users in their 
management of passwords. The paper concludes by providing a high level set of 
password guidelines, along with suggestions for mechanisms to support creating, 
encoding, retrieving and executing multiple passwords. 
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1. Introduction 
Research indicates that attacks on organisational, networked systems are increasing, 
(Harreld, 2001; BBC, 2010). Even in the context of increasing attacks, passwords 
remain the most commonly used mechanism to enable authentication. It is therefore 
unsurprising (Keith et al., 2007) that one means for attackers to penetrate systems is 
through the misuse of passwords. The threat of attack has resulted in security policies 
evolving with the primary aim of improving information security (Goguen and 
Meseguer, 1982; Casassa Mont and Thyne, 2008). Additionally, password security 
guidelines to be followed by users have been developed, such as advice on secure 
password creation, (Morris and Thompson, 1997; Zviran and Haga, 1999). However, 
the vulnerability of passwords remains, and research on the effect of security policies 
upon user behaviour (Adams and Sasse, 1999) has shown that certain security 
policies, enforced to increase security, have had the opposite effect. For example, an 
enforcement to frequently change passwords can lead to users writing passwords 
down to aid recall, thus detrimentally impacting security. 
Despite known problems with passwords as a means of authentication, Bonneau and 
Preibusch (2010) provide an argument as to why passwords are still the most common 
authentication mechanism. They postulate that efforts to replace passwords with 
more secure protocols, or federated identity systems, may fail because they do not 
recreate the entrenched ritual of password authentication. According to Bonneau and 
Preibusch, these rituals persist independent of their utility on the modern web, and 
establishing a feeling of trust with respect to web applications, may be a primary 
function of passwords for users. Accepting this argument means that passwords have 
(at least) dual roles - authentication and engendering trust, and these might have 
different consequences for organisations, and for individual users and their 
subsequent security behaviour. Changing authentication mechanisms from passwords 
in order to improve security therefore also means considering other mechanisms for 
establishing trust, and both establishing and maintaining trust is a major concern for 
web application designers, and their clients. 
Due to the rapid growth of the Internet, users now need more passwords, or some 
other means by which to satisfy an associated growth in instances of password 
authentication. An increasingly large number of online accounts, for social 
networking, shopping, etc. require users to create and remember an increasingly large 
number of different passwords. However, whilst users have to cope with this demand, 
the security policies of individual organisations or applications make no allowance for 
the cognitive load on users of maintaining multiple passwords, and act as though 
users only have a single password: that used for their particular service. Policies in 
general take no account of any other passwords the user must memorize. 
Consequently, password management is the sole responsibility of the user. Policies 
advise how to create ‘more secure’ passwords but not how to create multiple, secure 
passwords which are sufficiently different and do not interfere with each other, but 
which are nevertheless easy to retrieve from memory, and execute. Given the 
likelihood of the continuing popularity of passwords, following the argument of 
Bonneau and Preibusch, and the increasing number of passwords needed, it is 
necessary to know about password use in reality. How many passwords must users 
manage and how is this currently achieved? The need for accurate information arises 
since it is necessary to generate more effective security policies. These policies must 
provide guidelines for users which not only help to ensure that passwords are resilient 
to attacks, but also take into account actual user behaviour in relation to passwords, 
particularly in the context of multiple use of passwords within users’ everyday lives. 
In this paper the results of an empirical study conducted over a 7-day period to 
identify actual user behaviour in relation to passwords, are reported. Data were 
collected and analysed concerning the number of passwords in use, the user activities 
and services they are associated with, and how the different passwords are related, 
and managed. 
In the next section an overview of relevant background literature is provided. Section 
2 outlines the empirical study and the study results are reported in section 3. In 
section 4 the implications of the results are discussed, whilst section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
1.1. Background 
Whilst passwords are used to prevent unauthorised access, research has shown that 
people can show very lax security behaviour. For example, the BBC (2004) published 
study results demonstrating that over 70% of people would reveal their passwords for 
chocolate, and 79% would give away personal information (such as their mother’s 
maiden name, or their date of birth). Additionally, Schneier (2006) found that 
although people are creating more secure passwords than ten years ago, with regard to 
length and nature, new cracking methods are able to hack passwords easily. 
Different studies have investigated users’ generation and selection of passwords. One 
early example comes from Zviran and Haga (1999) who investigated the effect of data 
importance and sensitivity upon password generation. They found that users 
frequently change their passwords if the data is perceived as important or sensitive. 
However, no association was found between the nature of user-generated passwords, 
such as character length or composition, and the perceived importance or sensitivity 
of the data. The study reported in this paper will address the question as to whether 
this is still the case a decade later, whether it is common across users, and what might 
this be due to? Explanations may relate to the lack of perception about sensitivity of 
the service, about the need to ensure passwords to sensitive services are secure, and/or 
a lack of knowledge about what constitutes a secure password for these services. 
Both a lack of relevant security knowledge and absence of unpleasant security 
breaches have been used to explain users’ lax security behaviour. For instance, whilst 
Zviran argues that users are ‘naive’ and ignore the importance or sensitivity of the 
data whilst generating passwords, Adams and Sasse (1999) observed that users’ 
knowledge of password security (such as procedures, content, cracking etc.) impacts 
password behaviour. Similarly, Bubas (2008) found that experience with security 
problems affected people’s behaviour towards security. The assumption was that 
‘relaxed’ use of the Internet (including password usage) without fear (e.g. a disbelief 
in security threats) was due to an absence of previous unpleasant experiences. 
Lax security behaviour and relaxed use of the Internet is typified by users creating 
passwords with the primary function of enabling easy retrieval from memory, rather 
than with security as a priority. Investigations of password memorability and security 
found that users’ ability to create secure passwords that are also memorable is 
difficult. For example, Avarne (1988), Zviran and Haga (1990), Zviran and Haga 
(1999), Yan et al. (2004), and Keith et al. (2007), all demonstrated that certain 
characteristics (composition, selection/generation and lifetime) of passwords affect 
their memorability. Clearly, naively selected, user-generated passwords consisting of 
a common word or name, have a memorability advantage, but also the disadvantage 
that they are weak from a security perspective. This can be contrasted with random 
system-generated passwords, which are usually strong, but typically difficult to 
remember. Passwords that are difficult to remember (due to their nature or lifetime) 
have a high probability of being written down and therefore disclosed (e.g. Highland, 
1991; Adams and Sasse, 1999; Zviran and Haga, 1999). 
Balancing the often opposing security needs of the organisation, and the users’ need 
to create memorable passwords, has given rise to a series of studies where password 
characteristics are systematically manipulated, and their implications for security and 
memorability assessed. In this vein, Yan et al. (2004) investigated different types of 
passwords users generated when given instructions to either (a) select a password 
with low security constraints; (b) create random passwords (randomly selected letters 
A-Z and numbers 1-9); or (c) select a mnemonic phrase/passphrase. They analysed 
the memorability and strength of the passwords. Participants had difficulties in 
remembering random passwords, while mnemonic phrases (passphrases) were no 
harder to remember than naively selected passwords, but nevertheless as secure as a 
random password. From the results of the study reported here we will be able to 
indicate whether there is any use of mnemonic or meaningful phrases in user-
generated passwords, in real life. 
Similar to the afore-mentioned study, Keith et al. (2007) found that passphrases were 
no more difficult to recall from memory than simple passwords. Additionally, they 
investigated authentication failures due to typographical errors. They found that 
passphrases result in significantly higher login failures than naively selected 
passwords, due to typographical errors, but that these errors reduce over time. 
A related study to those of Yan et al. and Keith et al., was conducted by Wiedenbeck 
et al. (2005), who introduced ‘passpoints’ as an alternative to passwords and 
passphrases. Passpoints was considered to be a more secure graphical password 
system. Participants in their study created an alphanumeric or graphical password and 
used this for over 6 weeks. The results showed that in the graphical passwords 
condition users created a valid password with fewer difficulties than in the 
alphanumeric passwords condition, but whilst practicing their passwords they took 
longer and made more invalid password inputs than the alphanumeric users. In the 
longitudinal trials, the two groups performed similarly but the graphical group took 
more time on inputting their passwords due to their lack of perception about the 
precision needed in their interaction with the system. One question raised by the 
authors concerns whether multiple passpoints suffer from the same level of 
interference as multiple passwords. 
Other research investigating alternatives to passwords is described in Weir et al. 
(2010), who also considered problems from the perspective of possession of multiple 
passwords. These authors argue that 2 factor authentication could overcome the 
problems with managing multiple passwords. However, there is reluctance from new 
users to migrate to 2 factor authentication, regardless of how easy it may be to use. 
The pertinent difference relates to the distinction between having to carry something 
with them as opposed to having to learn another password. Weir et al. partially echo 
the ritual and entrenchment argument provided by Bonneau and Preibusch (2010) 
described earlier in the paper, by arguing that new methods may either be enhanced or 
suffer due to being new. In addition to problems of the cultural effects of changing 
from passwords as the sole means of authentication, the authors also note that 
usability of these systems could be a problem, and some 2 factor solutions do not 
always extend to multiple uses (i.e. more than one use as opposed to re-use). 
Re-use (BBC, 2004; Florencio and Herley, 2007) is one obvious means by which 
users manage the increasing demand to create online identities that require secure 
passwords to protect users from unauthorised access. The assumption is that people 
reuse the same insecure passwords frequently. Thus, hackers who obtain access to a 
password from a popular site might be able to use the same user-ID and password for 
different sites (Ives et al., 2004). Shay et al. (2010) noted significant amounts of 
password reuse in their comprehensive study, with over 80% of participants (381/470) 
reporting that they reused sets of passwords in different places, and over two thirds of 
these participants reused one password with slight modification for different accounts. 
The survey by Shay et al. comprises a unique comparison involving the same users 
operating under two different security policies, instituted by Carnegie Mellon 
University. Their study aimed to advance understanding of factors that make creating 
and following password policies difficult. They discovered that users (i) were 
annoyed at the change to a stricter password policy, (ii) did not find it difficult to 
comply, and (iii) thought that the newer, complex passwords improved security. The 
authors note that users were ‘neutral’ as to whether the change was worth the effort, 
and whether or not the organisation should revert to the previous, more lax policy. 
The results are particularly telling in that even though it was not considered difficult 
to comply and users perceived the result to be greater personal security they were still 
unsure whether it was worth the extra effort. It is not known whether users reported 
higher perceived security as a result of heightened awareness of security/more 
knowledge of security as an issue (perhaps as a result of being questioned about 
security), or because of the psychological need to see a benefit due to the additional 
mental effort expended. 
The finding in Shay et al.’s study that over 80% of users reuse passwords, and the 
small incidence (13%) of writing passwords down could potentially signal a shift in 
users’ coping strategies towards dealing with multiple passwords by reuse, rather than 
by writing down. This also explains to some degree the reported ease of creating new 
passwords and the ease of compliance found in the study. However, the authors do 
not indicate whether the reported 19% who struggled to comply were users who did 
not adopt reuse as a coping strategy. Even more interesting is the statistic that in 
creating a new password 52% of people modified the old password for that service, 
whilst only 11% modified a password from elsewhere, and only 3.7% reused a whole 
password from elsewhere. There are memory implications associated with creating 
new passwords. We would argue that many of Shay et al.’s study participants 
demonstrated meta-cognitive awareness of (and attempted to limit) the cognitive 
burden and effort required to learn a new password, by making a clear mnemonic 
association between the old and new passwords for this service. Thus the old 
password functions as a prime or becomes a hint for the retrieval of the new 
password. This could partially explain why users reported it was not difficult to 
comply with the new stricter policy but were still unsure as to whether the small 
amount of cognitive effort of modifying a password was worth any gain in security. 
A study by Dhamija and Perrig (2000) specifically investigated password 
management by reuse. They interviewed 30 people and estimated that 1-7 passwords 
were used for 10-50 websites. Similarly, in Brown et al.’s (2004) survey users were 
asked to login and count the number of passwords with the reported result that users 
had 8.18 password uses with only 4.45 of these being unique. Further, Gaw and 
Felten (2006) report that having to cope with multiple passwords is positively 
correlated with password reuse. They found that participants reused passwords over 
multiple accounts. Forty-nine undergraduates participated in their study which was 
part laboratory exercise and part survey. The majority of participants had three or 
more passwords and these were reused twice. Gaw and Felten contend that 
accumulation of accounts means more instances of reuse not more passwords being 
created. Specifically, they found that reuse rates were positively correlated with the 
number of accounts the participants held, but also even with few accounts passwords 
were reused. The study reported in this paper will specifically investigate the degree 
of reuse in the context of the number of passwords users possess. 
The previous research, and that reported by Gaw and Felten is thorough. The latter 
involves the investigation of different solutions users could employ – e.g. the use of 
different types of password, and/or the use of tools to manage passwords. The authors 
report that using themed passwords was relatively unpopular as the median use of 
related passwords was zero, unlike the results reported by Shay et al. (2010). 
Technological solutions were found to be unpopular, but the authors note that these 
solutions have disadvantages anyway. Participants in their study relied on their 
memory for password management. Again, it will be interesting to see if these 
findings are replicated in the present study. 
Gaw and Felten consider solutions to the problem that could be recommended in 
future. These solutions relate mainly to individual passwords. The first concerns 
changing the way in which authentication occurs, although the arguments of Bonneau 
and Preibusch, and Weir et al., still apply. The second concerns password creation: 
this could involve the system helping users in the task of secure password generation. 
The third solution involves shifting the burden of recalling passwords from the user to 
the system by allowing computers to store and retrieve passwords. However, the 
authors rightly argue that whilst this reduces the user’s burden it also results in the 
password being hidden from the user thus hindering learning of the password. Here 
the problem concerns encoding the password and not executing the password, which 
was the problem participants faced in the studies of Wiedenbeck et al., and Weir et al. 
We believe that repeated exposure to a password and the inherent context is one 
means by which an automatic stage of password learning, and depth of password 
processing, occurs. The problem still existing, after learning and storage have 
occurred, is successful retrieval among potential alternative password candidates. 
The complexity of the problem lies in the multiplicity of passwords to learn and then 
encode in some distinctive manner. The user’s task is to successfully create a series 
of secure, distinctive passwords that prime distinctive associations with particular 
services, and efficient and parsimonious mnemonics for remembrance. This is 
cognitively demanding even in isolation and it is therefore unsurprising that users 
adopt one or more coping strategies, such as password reuse or cognitively off-
loading, often using paper as an insecure cognitive handle. Moreover, this complex 
task is not performed in isolation, it is performed against a backdrop of competing 
user goals concerned with work and leisure tasks and activities that frequently take 
precedence over security goals. Devising and using passwords is another task the 
user must perform while interleaving other work and leisure activities. This is 
potentially one reason why the participants in the Shay et al. study are unsure of the 
utility of increased security (which they are unable to measure) against the needs of 
work productivity, or the valence of leisure activities (which they can place a value 
upon). 
In the next section we describe details of an empirical study into actual password use. 
2. Empirical study 
2.1. Research aims 
The overarching research aim is to investigate how people create, use and manage a 
plethora of passwords in the reality of their daily lives. Specifically, a number of 
questions that we aim to address in our study have arisen from outlining the prior 
studies of password authentication. These include: 
•	 What is the instance of actual password use over the study period, and what 
activities require password authentication during the day? 
•	 How many passwords do participants need to manage, what types of password 
are created, and how often are they changed? 
•	 Is there a relationship between the estimated strength of the passwords 
created, and participant perceptions of service/data sensitivity? 
•	 How do people manage multiple passwords, and what are the incidences of 
failure to authenticate and manage passwords? 
To address these questions, an appropriate methodology needs to be applied which 
produces rich, valid, qualitative and quantitative data about real password use without 
any investigative manipulation or influence by the researchers. The next section 
discusses the basis for the methodology chosen. 
2.2. Methodology. 
The past decade has seen the deployment of a variety of different data collection 
methods in empirical studies gathering password data. These methods range from 
experiments where password characteristics have been systematically manipulated 
and the effects observed and assessed, to more qualitative data from questionnaires 
and surveys (e.g. Shay et al., 2010). Surveys (e.g. Stanton et al., 2004) have sought 
the attitudes and reactions of people to passwords in specific contexts, and have 
attempted to understand what motivates security behaviour (Adams and Sasse, 1999; 
Novakovic et al., 2009). Other research has focused on investigating single web 
applications, or on passwords used on an individual computer. For instance, Schneier, 
(2006) investigated people’s passwords for the popular networking site ‘MySpace’, 
and Florencio and Herley (2007) gathered real data about people’s password usage 
based upon participants’ authentications from a particular computer. 
In addition to experiments and surveys, diary studies are frequently employed within 
HCI research. Brown, Sellen and O’Hara, (2000) conducted a diary study related to 
the development of a new handheld scanner, and reported that over a 7 day period 22 
users made 381 diary entries. Czerwinski et al. (2004) undertook a diary study of task 
switching and interruption involving 11 participants, and Inglesant and Sasse (2010) 
conducted a diary study of password use over five days. 
A comprehensive review of the use, utility, advantages and disadvantages of diary 
studies is presented in Lazar et al. (2010). They quote Alaszewski (2006) who argued 
that diaries are more accurate than other research methods, and Hyldegard (2006) who 
states that diaries fill the gaps in HCI research methods between observation in 
naturalistic settings or laboratories, and surveys. In many cases it is not feasible to 
bring users into laboratories, or observe them in their naturalistic settings at different 
times of the day and night. Neither can the detrimental effects of observation be 
overlooked. Surveys often fill this gap but as Lazar et al. (2010) indicate, surveys can 
lead to biased data, do not provide an understanding or explanation of behaviour, and 
are reliant on participant recall. Using diaries in conjunction with other methods is 
considered an ‘ideal’ alternative. Diaries can result in increased overall validity given 
the limited time lapse between an event occurring and it being recorded. Further 
advantages of diaries as a means of collecting data stem from their excellent facility 
for recording the existence and quantity of incidents that Lazar et al. term ‘user-
defined’. Diaries are also useful for examining situations where users’ behaviour in 
different locations or settings may be of interest, or an inherent part of the study, and 
where behaviours are not well understood. One disadvantage of using diaries as a 
means of collecting data is that the entries constitute self-reports. Whilst the validity 
of the entries is high due to the limited time lapse between an event occurring and it 
being recorded, it is hard to externally verify that the entry is accurate. However, it is 
clear that in gathering real data about the nature of users’ actual passwords, their use 
and management, there is no alternative but to rely on self-report, since this 
information is privy to the user alone, and not open to direct observations which 
would confirm accuracy. 
Diaries are typically kept for a short period of time – 1 or 2 weeks to ensure their 
completion (Rieman, 1993). Carter and Mankoff (2005) distinguish two types of diary 
– ‘feedback’, where the diary feeds back information to the researcher, and 
‘elicitation’, where the data recorded is used for prompting purposes and interviews 
take place at a later date, with users being encouraged to elaborate on diary entries. 
For the above reasons, the complementary data collection methods chosen for the 
study to be reported in this paper, consists of a diary study coupled with a debrief 
session/structured interview based upon the diary entries. The diary in this instance 
will provide feedback to the researchers, but also be used as the basis for the 
debrief/interview sessions where the users will be asked to reflect on and provide 
further details and explanations of their behaviour. Consequently, the diary will 
satisfy the characteristics of a hybrid feedback and elicitation diary, (Carter and 
Mankoff, 2005). The data of interest and the units of study are the authentications 
users make with passwords over the period of the diary. 
2.3. Participants 
The first question to address in conducting a diary study relates to the participants. 
Lazar et al. (2010) argue that strict representation is not as important for diaries as it is 
for large-scale survey or experimental design. Nevertheless diaries can produce rich, 
qualitative and quantitative data, and according to Alaszewski (2006) it is particularly 
important to involve participants who can furnish valuable and reliable information. 
Taking heed of Alaszewski’s point outlined above, we aim to embrace some breadth 
of the general population, by carrying out the study on a population of willing 
volunteers, but restricted to two different organisations. The first cohort originates 
from a commercial business organisation, and the second from an educational 
establishment. 
A total of 22 participants (13 female/9 male) were recruited from HP Laboratories in 
Bristol, and the computer science and other departments, at the University of Bath. 
These include: 
•	 6 female, administrative support staff (1 in the age range 20-29, 2 in the age 
range 30-39, and 3 between 40 and 49 years) and with between 18 and 25 
years of experience in using computers (average 21.8 years), 2 were educated 
in IT; 
•	 1 female (in the age range 30-40), and 3 male researchers (all in the 40-49 age 
range) each having an IT background and with 24-30 years of experience in 
using computers; 
•	 1 female lecturer with an educational background in IT – early 30s with 18 
years of experience in using computers; 
•	 1 male systems engineer in his 20s, with 16 years of computing experience 
and a background in IT, and; 
•	 7 PhD students and 3 MSc students, (4 female/6 male) from a variety of 
educational backgrounds (6 in the age range 20-29, 2 between 30-39, and 2 
between 40-49 years of age), and with between 14 and 28 (average 17.8) years 
of computing experience. 
As the above details demonstrate, the participants undertake a wide selection of roles 
and work activities with the organisations. They range in age from early 20s to late 
40s, with 14 to 30 years of experience using computers, and with just less than half 
the participants having an IT background. Consequently, the data collected originates 
from a small sample from a wide selection of computer users, and is not restricted to a 
specific user group. Whilst the size of the sample is relatively small for an empirical 
study, it is in line with other diary studies. 
2.4. Procedure 
The diary study was conducted during November and December 2008, over a 7-day 
period, deliberately kept short for three reasons: first, to ensure their organisations 
were agreeable for participants to take part; second, to encourage self-report by 
participants, ensuring that motivation remained high, and valid and reliable data 
resulted; and finally, we wanted to know the magnitude of password use in just 1 
week chosen at random, even though we concede that there will be additional services 
that are used on a monthly or yearly basis. The chosen period of diary completion – 7 
days – is consistent with the views of Rieman (1993) noted earlier. 
The study was concerned with collecting real data about actual password usage over 
the study period. We did not ask the users what their actual passwords were but the 
characteristics of their passwords for different services, used for different activities 
and tasks, at different times of the day, were deemed of interest. The participants were 
made aware of the aims of the study and clearly understood the purposes of 
maintaining the diary. They were also aware that at the end of the period they would 
be allowed more time and freedom to reflect on their use of passwords and elaborate 
on any points arising from the diary entries, in debrief and structured interview 
sessions. The participants were also made aware that the purpose of the debrief and 
structured interviews was to gather additional information about the properties of 
passwords. 
The participants were requested to take notes (whilst undertaking tasks and activities 
with services) of different factors related to the usage and management of passwords, 
including failures. The diary consisted of a form that included detailed questions 
about the authentication process. These included the time of authentication; which 
password was used (the actual password was not divulged); location (home, office, 
mobile or other); activity before and after authentication; whether any hints were 
provided; the estimated time taken to authenticate; whether the authentication was 
successful or failed; if it failed, what the nature of the problem was for example, 
whether the user knew if the failure originated from either mistyping (a typographical 
error) or misremembering, and what participants did in order to recover from failure 
(for example, try again or call the helpdesk). Participants were asked to complete the 
relevant details on the form (multiple copies were provided) each time they 
authenticated over the 7 days. 
After participants had completed their password diary a debrief/in-depth interview 
was conducted. Here, detailed information concerning the passwords and their use 
was recorded. The information gathered included the nature of the passwords (the 
passwords themselves were not disclosed), whether they were shared between 
services, whether they were known by a third person, how they were generated and 
remembered, how often they were used, and how often they were changed. 
At the end of the debrief all participants received a £20 bookstore gift voucher as a 
reward for taking part in the study. All stored data has been anonymized. 
In the following section the combined results of the diary study, debrief and 
structured interview, are reported. 
3. Results 
Over the 7-day period, 991 diary entries/password authentications were recorded, 
suggesting that the task of diary entry was taken seriously, and the motivation to 
comply was high. Each of the following sections will be structured to address the 
research questions outlined in section 2.1. 
3.1. What is the instance of actual password use over the seven-day period, and what 
activities require password authentication during the day? 
3.1.1. Password use 
The 991 authentications reported provide an average of 45.05 authentications per 
person over the 7-day period, (N=22, min=17, max=173, SD=34.08, median=37.50). 
The range and standard deviation indicate large individual differences between 
participants. Table 1 shows the magnitude and pattern of password authentications per 
day. 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
165 178 168 177 150 66 87 
Table 1: Magnitude and pattern of password authentications per day. 
3.1.2. Activities needing authentication 
This section is concerned with the different activities needing authentication, their 
authentication frequency, and also the times of day when services are used. The 
rationale for including activities and times of day within the diary study, is twofold. 
First, from a user, work and productivity perspective, the data may be interesting as a 
basis for future investigations into when participants are interrupted, what activities 
are being disrupted, and consequently whether users are likely to comply. Second, if 
security professionals have some knowledge of the pattern of sensitive service use, 
and also whether those services are instances where insecure passwords are reused 
from other services (whether sensitive or not), then it may be possible to speculate 
when security breaches are likely, and when to be extra cautious and vigilant. 
In completing the password diary, participants described the activity that needed 
password authentication. These activities include: working (e.g. beginning a ‘work’ 
task) with 422 instances; email (checking, reading or responding to email) with 285 
instances; leisure (e.g. browsing internet sites for personal use) with 115 instances; 
login (logging into a network/computer) with 74 instances; money (e.g. making 
payments or checking bank accounts) with 40 instances; communicating 
(authenticating for a communication service such as ‘MSN’ or ‘Skype’) with 39 
instances; unknown (an activity that was not described) with 12 instances, and 
meeting (e.g. authenticating for a conference call over the phone) with 4 instances. 
The different time zones stipulated were: morning from 6:00 till 11:59am; midday, 
12:00-13:59; afternoon, 14:00-17:59; evening, 18:00-22:59; and night 23:00-5:59. 
The majority of the authentications for the different activities occur in the morning 
potentially indicating this is when the most disruption to work occurs. An exception 
to this pattern includes meeting authentications that mainly occur in the afternoon (3 
out of 4). Additionally, the highest proportion of money-related activities occurred in 
the evening (13 out of 40). Table 2 shows the different activities needing password 
authentication within the different time zones, whilst Table 3 indicates the number of 
different services needing authentication over the 7-day period. 
Morning Midday Afternoon Evening Night 
Working 229 51 97 44 1 
Email 133 24 50 71 7 
Leisure 48 13 18 33 3 
Login 48 6 8 12 0 
Money 11 7 7 13 2 
Communicating 23 4 5 5 2 
Unknown 9 1 1 1 0 
Meeting 1 0 3 0 0 
Table 2: Different activities that needed authentication within different time zones. 
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
Working 72 89 89 81 69 9 13 
Email 47 48 47 45 43 29 26 
Leisure 17 14 11 15 11 12 35 
Login 11 14 9 17 10 8 6 
Money 9 8 3 9 6 4 1 
Communicating 6 5 5 8 7 3 5 
Unknown 3 1 1 1 4 1 1 
Meeting 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 
Table 3: Number of services (175 in total) used for different activities over the seven-
day period. 
Given the extent of password use across the 7-day period, the next question to address 
relates to the number and type of passwords users created. 
3.2. How many passwords do participants need to manage, what types of password 
are created, and how often are they changed? 
3.2.1. Number of passwords to manage 
The mean number of passwords to manage is 7.95 (SD=2.46, min=4, max=13, 
median=8.00) across 175 reported services. Again the range and standard deviation 
indicate individual differences between the participants. 
3.2.2. Password types created 
With respect to the types of passwords created, the passwords reported by 
participants, to authenticate for a particular service, were divided into seven types. 
These include, (i) a single/common word, or names (e.g. a single name, ‘Lucy’); (ii) 
meaningful phrases (a simple sentence where the words are connected, e.g. 
‘WhoHasSentMeNewMail’); (iii) variation/abbreviation on a meaningful phrase (the 
initial letters of a sentence, e.g. the first letters of the sentence ‘Who has sent me new 
mail?’ would be ‘Whsmnm?’); (iv) a meaningful combination of letters and numbers 
(e.g. initials and birthdays); (v) a meaningful number pattern (e.g. ‘0845’); (vi) 
random characters; or vii) some other pattern (a combination of e.g. words and 
letters). 
As described in Yan et al. (2004) the most secure passwords are random passwords 
and variations of a meaningful phrase. In contrast, single/common word or name 
passwords, even if strengthened with numeric suffixes or prefixes are not secure, 
(Schneier, 2006). In contrast, number pattern passwords or passwords that contain 
some other meaningful combination can be seen as fairly secure, depending on their 
pattern or combination. 
Figure 1 shows the frequency of the different password types created. Participants 
created 27.7% of passwords that were a variation on meaningful phrases, e.g. initial 
letters of meaningful sentences. This was followed by 25.9% of passwords that 
contained a single/common word or name; random passwords, 12.7%; some other 
pattern (for example, a combination of words and letters), 12.0%; a meaningful 
combination of letters and numbers, 9.0%; a meaningful phrase, 7.2%; and number 
pattern, 5.4%. 
In relation to matching password types to activities, money-related activities 
contained mainly letters and numbers, and the least secure passwords containing 
letters only included leisure, and a subset of work-related activities, (both 10 out of 
35). 
Figure 1: Frequency of the different password types created. 
3.2.3. Changing passwords 
Participants reported how often they changed passwords. Out of 175 passwords that 
participants reported for the different services, 139 were never changed; 17 were 
changed more than once per year; 16 were changed up to once per year; and 3 had 
been changed once in total. 
A chi-square test revealed a significant association between the different password 
or not the password was never changed, 
. The main reason for this significant overall effect lies in the 
types participants created and whether 
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fact that none of the passwords containing random characters or meaningful 
combinations of letters and numbers were ever changed. 
passwords were changed more than once per year, 
. The main reason for this significant overall effect relates to the 
Additionally, there was a significant association between the different password types 
and whether or not 
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fact that the odds of changing a password more than once per year were 7.54 times 
higher if the password contained a variation on a meaningful phrase than if the 
password consisted of a word or name. 
The next section addresses the question as to whether there was any attempt to match 
secure passwords to sensitive services. 
3.3. Is there a relationship between the estimated strength of the passwords created, 
and participant perceptions of service/data sensitivity? 
Figure 2 shows the frequency of perceived sensitivity of the services. Most services 
(39.4%) were perceived by the participants to be ‘very sensitive’. This was followed 
by services perceived as ‘fairly sensitive’, 26.3%; ‘sensitive’, 25.1%; ‘not very 
sensitive’, 6.3%; and, ‘not at all sensitive’, 2.9%. The passwords were rated as ‘highly 
secure’ (uncrackable), 17.7%; ‘secure’ (hard to crack), 39.4%; ‘fairly secure’, 27.4%; 
‘not very secure’, 10.9%; and ‘insecure’ (easy to guess), 4.6%. 
Figure 2: Frequency of perceived sensitivity of the service. 
The participants made some attempts to match passwords and services to their 
perceived strength/security level. For example, participants matched passwords that 
‘they considered to be secure’ to services perceived to be very sensitive; fairly secure 
passwords to fairly sensitive services; and insecure passwords to not very sensitive 
services. There was a significant positive correlation between participants’ security 
perception of the service and their estimated password strength (r =0.34, p<0.01). 
However, this does not mean the passwords were in reality more secure: This is 
dependent on the participants’ understanding of what constitutes a secure password. 
Not only did participants attempt to match secure passwords to sensitive services, 
they were also concerned with password reuse on very sensitive services. A chi-
square test revealed a significant association between perceiving a service as very 
sensitive and whether or not the password was unique ( 
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(1) = 6.51, p < .05). The 
odds of using a unique password were 2.25 times higher for a service that was 
perceived as very sensitive than if the service was perceived as not very sensitive. 
There was no significant association between security perceptions of the service and 
the reuse of whole or partial passwords. 
In the next section we report findings regarding user strategies for successful 
password management, and where password failures occurred. 
3.4. How do people manage multiple passwords, and what are the incidences of 
failure to authenticate and manage passwords? 
The studies by Dhamija and Perrig (2000) and Gaw and Felten (2006) led us to 
investigate how people manage the need to create and use more passwords. Specific 
questions which arose are: (i) what is the number of unique passwords and the extent 
of reuse; (ii) with respect to memorisation, what use is made of hints and how much 
cognitive off-loading (i.e. writing down and sharing of passwords) to aid memory 
occurs; and finally, (iii) what is the incidence of failure to authenticate and manage 
passwords? 
3.4.1. Unique passwords and the extent of reuse 
Out of the 175 detected services that needed passwords to authenticate, 69 passwords 
were unique (not reused in a different service and did not share any parts of other 
passwords), 86 (whole) passwords were reused in other services (up to 4 times), and 
20 passwords reused parts of another password. In relation to service sensitivity and 
reuse, we reported in the previous section that the odds of using a unique password 
were 2.25 times higher for a service perceived by participants as very sensitive 
compared with services which were not perceived as very sensitive. 
3.4.2. Managing passwords by cognitive off-loading - writing down and sharing with 
others 
Clearly, managing multiple passwords requires effort for creation, encoding, retrieval 
and execution. None of the participants reported using password management tools. 
They relied mainly on memory to retrieve their unique and reused passwords. Some 
participants reported the use of hints to aid memory of passwords (12/991). For the 
reuse of whole passwords, the hints primarily indicated relationships between 
passwords, i.e. the password was either the same as their ‘main’ password, or their 
‘home’ password. Interestingly, no participant recorded any hints regarding 
passwords that reused parts of another password. 
The main strategies used for managing passwords other than reuse relate to 
cognitively offloading by either writing passwords down or sharing with a third party. 
From the debrief, it was found that 11 passwords were written down out of a total of 
175. This number may appear quite low but this is set in context given the extent of 
password reuse. The results indicate that the main factor that affects whether or not a 
password is written down relates to the password type and characteristics, with other 
factors such as frequency of use also affecting participants’ behaviour. Our 
calculations show that the odds of writing a password down were 17.84 times higher 
if it was unique, and 11.03 times higher if it contained only numbers. Additionally, 
the odds of writing a password down were 10.20 times higher if it was used 
occasionally rather than frequently. There was no association between the sensitivity 
of the service and writing down passwords. 
There was some sharing of passwords with third parties, and Bonneau and Preibusch 
(2010) argue that this is one mechanism by which intimacy and trust between people 
is displayed. Responses to questions in the debrief about why passwords were shared 
predominantly stated that the service was also shared. Participants also reported the 
use of hints relating to shared passwords and these constituted who else knew the 
shared password. However, further questioning of participants as to who shared their 
passwords, we deemed to be overly intrusive. 
3.4.3. Unsuccessful password authentication, failure to manage passwords and 
recovery from failure 
Over the 7-day period 48 failures to enter a password were reported. The different 
types of failures reported by participants include: mistyping the password (19); 
misremembering the password (15); uncertainty about which password to chose (6); 
forgetting the password altogether (4); some other problem (3); and, being interrupted 
during the authentication process (1). It could be argued that of these categories, 
mistyping and interruption (20/48) may be more of an indication of difficulty in 
executing password authentication. On the other hand, misremembering passwords, 
interference between passwords evidenced by confusion over which password was 
appropriate for the service, and forgetting the passwords altogether (25/48) may all be 
instances of memory failure of one type or another, and relate specifically to difficulty 
in managing memorisation of multiple passwords. 
There were relationships between failures and password ‘uniqueness’. A significant 
mistyped the password/failed to enter the password correctly, 
association was found between a unique password and whether or not participants 
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The odds of mistyping a password were 3.20 times higher if the password was unique 
than if it was reused. There was also a significant association between the type of 
not participants failed to enter the password 
. The odds of mistyping a password was 8.42 times 
password and whether or 
correctly 
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higher if it contained a number pattern than if it contained a meaningful phrase. There 
was also a significant association between changing a password and whether or not an 
authentication failure occurred, . The odds of failing to enter the 
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password correctly were 2.05 times higher if the password was changed than if it was 
never changed. 
In addition to the incidence of mistyping unique passwords, a chi-square test revealed 
a significant association between a unique password and whether or not the password 
was misremembered, . The odds of misremembering a password 
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were 2.86 times higher if it was a unique password than if it was not unique. There 
participants misremembered a password, . The odds of 
was also a significant association between the type of password and whether or not 
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misremembering a password were 9.52 times higher if the password contained a 
number pattern than if it was a variation on a meaningful phrase. 
Participants reported 24 recoveries from failures to authenticate. These reported 
recoveries include: trying to re-enter the password (14); requesting a new password 
(5); giving up or trying to authenticate later (3); and, locating and using a hint to 
enable authentication (2). A chi-square test revealed a significant association between 
the different password types and whether or not participants tried to re-enter a 
. The odds of trying to re-enter a password were password, 
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46.08 times higher if it contained a number pattern than if it was a variation on a 
meaningful phrase. There was also a significant association between unique 
. No reused password was recovered from failure due to 
passwords and whether or not a new password was requested as recovery from 
failure, 
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requesting a new password. 
In summary, it is clear that the need to manage multiple passwords has led to different 
strategies to aid password use and remembrance. There were 991 authentications to 
175 services, however, only 69 of these were unique (not reused in a different service 
and did not share any parts of other passwords), and 11 in total, including passwords 
that were reused, were written down. The likelihood of writing down was highest if 
the password was unique, followed by if it contained numbers only and finally, if it 
was used infrequently. Further insecure security behaviour occurs in the sharing of 
passwords. There were 25 failures of authentication that relate to difficulties in 
managing the memorisation of passwords. Whether or not the password is unique, 
and the type of password affects both mistyping and successful or unsuccessful 
remembrance. 
In the next section, we discuss the study results in the context of the previous 
literature and with particular regard to managing multiple passwords. 
4. Discussion 
The primary research aim was to investigate the reality of password creation, use and 
management in the context of an increasing need for password authentication. The 
research referred to earlier in the paper by Bonneau and Preibusch, suggests that 
passwords are here to stay for sometime in the future given their dual roles of 
engendering trust, and as a means of authentication. In this regard, it may be 
beneficial to undertake further research into how password use can be made more 
secure, and password policies be devised that could maximize compliance by making 
it easier for users to comply. The review of the literature, taken together with the 
results of the empirical study reported in this paper show that currently insecure 
behaviour persists, and there is a lack of appropriate policies related to creating and 
managing multiple passwords. A significant problem underpinning insecure 
behaviour relates to the distinction between the magnitude of attention paid to 
individual password creation and use, as opposed to the paucity of attention paid to 
the collection of passwords a user possesses. 
A further research aim is to use the study results to improve user behaviour. The 
study data indicate three reasons for poor security from a user perspective; a lack of 
knowledge about security, erroneous knowledge, and poor strategies for coping with 
password overload. To improve security, two goals need to be accomplished. First we 
need to identify what knowledge is lacking or erroneous, and provide appropriate 
education. Second, we need to change users’ insecure strategies for coping with 
multiple passwords. In order to achieve this second goal we need to replace existing 
user strategies with effective secure strategies that capitalize on users’ existing real-
world knowledge, cognition and memory processes and mechanisms, making it easier 
to comply. These strategies in future should provide the basis for developing policies 
and support structures for managing password collections. 
The high level guidelines provided later in this discussion have been specifically 
devised in an attempt to replace users’ poor strategies for coping with password 
overload – reuse, writing down and sharing as evidenced in the study results – with 
effective and secure strategies. The substance of these strategies needs to be dictated 
by an understanding of memory capabilities and limitations. 
One incidence of insecure behaviour to be discussed relates to the study a decade ago 
by Zviran and Haga (1999). They found that users changed their passwords 
frequently to sensitive services but there was no association between the type/security 
of a user-generated password, and the sensitivity of the service. We postulated that 
this could be due to lack of perception of i) the sensitivity of the service, ii) the need 
to match security of the password to service sensitivity, or iii) a lack of knowledge 
about what constitutes a secure password for these services. The results of the study 
reported here, indicate that participants did perceive the respective sensitivity of the 
services they were using. Of these many, but not all, saw the necessity of matching 
password security to service sensitivity: some participants used both stronger and 
unique, as opposed to reused, passwords for sensitive services. However, problems 
with user behaviour still exist in that the unique passwords created were very seldom 
changed. Moreover, there were incidences of a complete lack of knowledge about 
what constituted a secure or insecure password. The argument by Adams and Sasse 
(1999) appears to still apply - users were not averse to adhering to security policy but 
they did not know how. This indicates the rather obvious point, reiterated many times 
before that users need better education about, and technical support for, (cf. Gaw and 
Felten, 2006) secure password creation and use. In this case the education would be 
designed to overcome a lack of knowledge rather than better strategic use of existing 
knowledge. 
Further examples of insecure behaviour relate to password reuse in an attempt to 
satisfy the need for multiple passwords. The results of the study reported here on 
actual password use, corroborate the findings of Dhamija and Perrig (2000), Brown et 
al. (2004), Florencio and Herley (2007), Gaw and Felten (2006) and Shay et al. 
(2010). Users frequently reused passwords to satisfy the demand for more passwords, 
and the proportion of unique passwords is generally quite low in relation to the 
number of services used. Also there were instances of password reuse to sensitive 
services by participants and anecdotal evidence from conversations with some of the 
participants indicated that they do not generally reflect upon their approach to 
security. The substance of related comments from two participants was that, ‘it had 
just occurred to them that reusing passwords across banking, social networking sites, 
and work environments was not a good idea’. It appeared that it may have been the 
first time they had taken the opportunity to reflect on their behaviour and this was as a 
result of being questioned, and not of their own volition. 
In Gaw and Felten’s study the median use of ‘themed’ passwords for reuse was zero. 
This is due to their participants reusing whole passwords. In the study reported here, 
86 passwords were reused up to four times but also 20 passwords reused parts of other 
passwords. These results are in contrast to those reported in Gaw and Felten. This 
finding could be linked to some reported incidences of authentication failure where 
participants were confused about which one of a collection of related passwords to 
chose. 
Participants in our study relied on memory for retrieving passwords. They also 
shared, wrote down and reused passwords, with a small number of hints for memory 
retrieval, all forming part of their coping strategies for dealing with multiple 
passwords. In the past some security policies (Adams and Sasse, 1999) have lessened 
rather than improved security. The example they provide, as outlined in the 
introduction, concerns the fact that frequent requirements to change passwords leads 
to passwords being written down. The crux of the problem is that users will devise 
strategies, including cognitive offloading, to avoid problems of not being able to 
successfully authenticate. Unsuccessful attempts at authentication are costly to users 
and their productivity, and password recovery is also a cost to service providers, (see 
the economic and strategic discussion in Bonneau and Preibusch (2010) regarding the 
provider efforts and steps that can be taken to recover passwords). According to the 
Gartner Group (http://www.mandylionlabs.com/PRCCalc/PRCCalc.htm) between 
20% and 50% of all help desk calls are for password resets, and Forrester Research 
indicate that the average help desk labour cost for a single password reset is about $70 
in the USA. 
The study data revealed 48 failures to authenticate, reported by participants. There 
were both different types of failure and different failure rates depending upon the 
uniqueness and type of password. For example, the odds of mistyping a password 
were 3.2 times higher if the password was unique, 8.42 times higher if they contained 
a number pattern than meaningful phrases, and 2.05 higher if they had been changed. 
Additionally, the odds of misremembering a password were 2.86 times higher if it was 
unique and 9.52 times higher if it was a number pattern. In relation to overcoming 
authentication failures, the odds of re-entering a password were 46.08 times higher if 
it was a number pattern, unique passwords were primarily those where new 
passwords/resets were requested, and interestingly no failure involving a reused 
password was ever recovered by requesting a new password/reset. 
The cognitive processes and user behaviour that underlie failures are complex. In the 
absence of hypotheses and systematic study, it is not possible to do more than 
speculate concerning the reasons for failure. For instance, it is not clear from the 
data, whether the activity of mistyping is independent of memory retrieval problems 
even though participants categorise incidences of mistyping and misremembering 
differently. Unique passwords for example which take more effort to retrieve, have a 
higher chance of being mistyped. Are they retrieved wrongly because they are less 
frequently used, or does less frequent use lead to inadequate practice of the motor 
skill of typing the specific password, i.e. an execution error? Unique passwords also 
have a higher chance of being reported as misremembering failures and the odds of 
them being written down are over 17 times higher than reused passwords. This clearly 
shows that unique passwords are particularly problematic for users, both to remember 
correctly and to execute when remembered. Users may well be aware of this and 
adopt the strategy of writing them down as a precaution against authentication failure. 
If they are not written down or they cannot be located, then participants request 
another replacement unique password. By contrast no failures of reused passwords 
were ever recovered by requesting a new password. 
The number of participants in our study was relatively low. This means making strong 
claims and generalisations from our data is problematic. We are not able to 
extrapolate from the representatives of the organisations to other individuals in those 
organisations, since they were a small number of volunteers, and also we cannot 
extrapolate to other organisations. It is important that the tentative predictions we 
now make from our data are understood within the limited scope of the study, and that 
these predictions may not hold for larger and different populations, and further 
research with these populations is needed. 
One of a number of tentative predictions we can make from our study data relates to 
the effects of following security policies advocating the use of unique passwords, 
whilst not providing some support structure for their retrieval in the light of multiple 
password use. Users who must create unique passwords will suffer higher incidences 
of mistyping, higher incidences of misremembering and will adopt two coping 
strategies – they will request new passwords thus costing password providers, and 
they will write the password down thus weakening security. 
It has long been known that different password characteristics affect their 
memorability and our data in particular show that numbers, when used in isolation, 
cause users problems. However they are far less problematic when used in a 
meaningful combination with letters or words. Both retrieving and execution of 
number pattern passwords is poor. The fact that the odds of password re-entry are 
over 46 times higher for number pattern passwords demonstrates how disruptive these 
are for the user, their work productivity and daily life. Another tentative 
recommendation from the study findings suggests that using numbers in isolation is 
not to be recommended by security policies and supporting users in creating 
passwords that combine meaningful numbers with other secure meaningful material 
would be beneficial for memory retrieval, for execution and to avoid frequent 
occurrences of password re-entry. Passwords containing only numbers and unique 
passwords are not entirely independent of one another. Therefore, it is possible that if 
numbers with specific meanings and other secure meaningful material are used for 
unique passwords (as opposed to numbers only unique passwords), that some of the 
problems with unique passwords may also be addressed. 
It is of fundamental importance that human capabilities and strategies for dealing with 
overload are understood and taken into account in devising future security policies, 
guidelines and education. The reason some policies are not successful is that they are 
not founded on a sufficient theoretical understanding of the users’ tasks, and the 
different psychological processes inherent in creating, encoding, retrieving and 
executing passwords. Consequently, it is not always possible to predict user 
behaviour in adhering to, or working around security policies, nor does it take the 
stance of maximising the users’ chances of following security policies. In the next 
section we consider how to overcome problems with password overload by devising 
guidelines and mechanisms for managing multiple passwords. Our ultimate goal in 
the future is to improve the management of unique (but possibly related) passwords, 
reduce password reuse and the specific aspects of cognitive offloading that lessen 
security. 
4.1. Guidelines to support password creation and management 
The motivation for developing guidelines for multiple password creation and 
management is that currently policies exist for individual as opposed to multiple 
passwords, and the near absence of policies for creating and remembering collections 
of passwords is clearly a failing. 
The bases for the guidelines relate to both the problems with insecure password 
behaviour outlined in prior literature, and also in our study results. For instance, with 
respect to the prior literature, Shay et al. demonstrate that despite little effort to 
comply and a perception of greater security, users do not know whether it is worth the 
extra mental effort of complying with a policy requiring password change. Similarly, 
in the study reported here, there is clear evidence of users limiting the cognitive effort 
in devising and memorizing large numbers of passwords by reusing, sharing and 
writing them down. Given that the main problems users face is with memorisation, 
there needs to be a means by which memory of passwords, is improved. Specifically, 
in order to improve security, poor and insecure strategies for creating, encoding, and 
retrieving collections of passwords must be replaced with effective, secure strategies. 
Earlier in this paper we argued that the users’ ‘job’ with respect to passwords is to 
‘successfully create a series of secure, distinctive passwords that prime distinctive 
associations with particular services, and efficient and parsimonious mnemonics for 
remembrance’, against a backdrop of competing work/leisure goals. Therefore, we 
need to develop appropriate policies, guidelines, and education to support users’ 
psychological processes for managing multiple passwords. This is instead of 
inflicting demands and goal competition onto users, which means security goals have 
a poor chance of being met when set against work goals with tight deadlines with 
clear and immediate consequences, when they are not met. 
How do users cope with overload or the need to make sense of infinite demands on 
their memory and attention? The answer is that they make consummate use of 
memory processes, such as recall and recognition. They also problem solve, apply 
guesswork and trial and error, and they infer in making sense of these activities from 
past experience. Humans categorise in order to limit and handle vast arrays of 
stimuli. This supports inference and generalisation. The process of categorisation aids 
recall and provides structure and relationships between stimuli that underpins 
informed guesses. The stimuli of interest here are numbers of passwords, and users’ 
present insecure coping strategies involve limiting instances of passwords to be 
categorised, by reusing them. 
We postulate that the process of categorisation could help in creating, forging 
relationships between and recalling passwords. Moreover, it would be particularly 
helpful in recalling a collection of passwords. Therefore, the purpose of the 
guidelines is to support users in creating and managing password collections (as 
opposed to individual passwords about which sufficient literature exists). 
In the past security policies have recommended the provision of hints that supposedly 
prime memory associations to aid recall of passwords. However, the format of these 
hints need to be tightly specified, clearly associated with the password(s) in question, 
and in their implementation must not be the passwords themselves. From our study 
data, it is clear that the hints written down by participants involved either complete 
disclosure of the passwords, or names of people who share their passwords. 
We think we can add to high level guidelines related to memory, and the use of hints 
and primes. For instance, security policies, guidelines and education should support 
the user to: 
(i)	 harness their ability to categorize to support the encoding and retrieval of 
multiple passwords; 
(ii)	 provide guidelines to support users in mapping and representing categories of 
passwords to enable creation, encoding and retrieval of appropriate passwords; 
(iii)	 create cognitive handles: allow users to/or demonstrate to users how to, write 
down encrypted categories/hints related to their passwords; 
(iv)	 allow users to make guesses, use trial and error, and problem solving, in 
retrieving candidate passwords. 
We are aware that some of these recommendations in implementation could be very 
contentious. For instance, one means of complying with the guideline to allow users 
to guess, use trial and error, and problem solve, is to allow users more password input 
attempts. This would allow users to try different candidate (those with a high 
likelihood of matching) passwords when they are unsure which one is associated with 
a service. However, Florencio and Herley specifically point out that lockouts are an 
effective way of curtailing password hacking. Moreover, we do not possess enough 
knowledge of user strategies to know when they guess as opposed to reuse, how many 
guesses they might make before they give up, or whether the benefit to users’ 
cognitive load is paid for by disproportionately more hacking attempts that are 
successful. 
However, we suspect that security could be improved as a result of supporting users 
in creating encryptions and writing them down as opposed to actual passwords. It 
could potentially be better also if designs could be devised to lead users through a 
process of discovery that recreates the context, by means of ‘transfer appropriate 
processing’, (Morris et al., 1977) in which the passwords were created and encoded. 
The recommendations above could attract the criticism of being too general and 
vague. With this in mind, we now try to apply the recommendations/guidelines in a 
specific manner. We also attempt to overcome some of the problems, reported in our 
data, with unique passwords. In addition, the diary study indicates that people reuse 
parts of, and whole, passwords, and there is a need to reduce (even if we cannot 
eliminate) password reuse. Passwords are typically considered in isolation but from 
the perspective of users there is actually a collection of them. Rather than 
remembering a single password, users have to remember a number of passwords, and 
this requires different methods. Consequently, methods are needed to support 
memory for a collection of passwords instead of just one - hence the advantage of 
considering categorisation as a means to aid recall of passwords. 
However, a fundamental problem exists in utilising a single category of passwords 
given the need to distinguish between individual passwords for particular 
authentication events, to curtail interference, and retrieve the appropriate passwords, 
(category members). One generic solution is to have a number of categories, and 
favourite instances, (along perhaps with related features and events to make up 
meaningful phrases or their abbreviations) so that they are the first to be recalled. For 
some (natural, artificial, event or adhoc) categories specific instances naturally come 
to mind, these instances being core to the individual’s category (based on prior 
experiences), and these are the quickest and easiest to recall. Different categories 
would be associated with particular services. The problem can then become 
remembering the category/service associations. This clearly needs further 
investigation in a future research programme, but it does not seem to be any more of a 
challenge than currently remembering which password (possibly made up of parts of 
other passwords) to reuse for specific services. 
When categories are formed they are structured taking account of shared, overlapping 
and common features and attributes. The core of the categorical structure lends itself 
to representing the instances with the most shared, common or overlapping features. 
The category core and outwards to the periphery have frequently been represented as 
multidimensional spaces, or visually as a series of ever widening circles from the core 
to the periphery. Coincidentally, within the social sciences, a method known as socio-
mapping, (Bahbouh, 1993) has been used to represent relationships between data, e.g. 
social network data, as a series of concentric circles. More recently, this method has 
been used by individuals in representing their feelings of ‘belongingness’, with other 
people/communities (real or virtual) – families, friends, friends of friends, 
acquaintances, etc. These socio-maps consist of concentric circles of ‘belonging’ with 
close family members represented as nodes at the centre spiralling outwards to the 
periphery where acquaintances may be represented. A potential solution to associating 
sensitivity with secure passwords is to marry the process of categorisation (in this 
case, ‘people’) with the representational formalism of socio-maps with the closest 
relationships at the core. The idea is to use the closeness of the relationships as a 
mnemonic for service sensitivity – following this principle the closest family 
members would be the first to be protected, and therefore require the strongest 
password. For instance, close family members could form part of a meaningful phrase 
which includes them, related events and details about them, and the nearer they are to 
the centre the more likely they are to be used for a highly sensitive service. Clearly, 
‘people’ is only one of many exemplar categories that could be employed in this way 
– the process is a general rather than specific solution. 
The idea of marrying categorisation processes, and socio-maps as a means to 
represent categories of passwords, with the most sensitive associations at the centre, 
as an aid in multiple password management, needs thorough investigation. To be 
successful, it must lead to password collections that are easier to remember and 
distinguish, and lessen instances of insecure user behaviour. Consequently, a future 
research aim is to experimentally manipulate three factors, (i) different types of 
categories, (ii) different instructions to participants, and (iii) different representations 
of passwords and password collections. The effects of these manipulations on 
improvements to security, password memorability, and accurate retrieval of 
passwords for specific instances of authentication, would need to be assessed. The 
issue would be whether using categorisation could support accessing the correct 
password from the multiple passwords possessed, and whether or not it increased the 
efficiency of unique passwords whilst also reducing the incidence of reuse and lax 
cognitive offloading. Moreover, a series of further empirical studies investigating the 
utility of providing different supports for user-defined encryption and deciphering 
encryptions, is needed. These encryptions could be number-based, textual, graphical, 
or even employ maps (including socio-maps) that were involved in the password 
collection created. Depending on the results of these studies, a long term aim is to 
develop clear unequivocal guidelines, and technological support for enabling users to 
take the responsibility of successfully managing multiple passwords. 
5. Conclusion 
The study reported in this paper has provided provisional but rich data about the 
reality of password use, and the management of a plethora of passwords, in the 
context of people’s everyday lives. The results demonstrate that lax security 
behaviour involving password reuse, writing down and sharing passwords still exists, 
along with a lack of or erroneous knowledge about what constitutes a secure or 
insecure password. Tentative predictions have been made from the study data about 
user behaviour in the light of security policies that advocate the use of unique or 
number only passwords. 
Our main argument has been that it is fundamentally important that human 
capabilities and strategies for dealing with overload are understood and taken into 
account in devising future security policies, guidelines and education. We further 
argue that the reason some policies are not successful is that they are not founded on a 
sufficient theoretical understanding of the users’ tasks, and the different psychological 
processes inherent in creating, encoding, retrieving and executing passwords. As a 
consequence we have suggested the utilisation of categorisation as a mechanism for 
aiding password creation, encoding, retrieval and execution. 
Finally, we outlined a future research programme of experimental studies to test if 
categorisation aids in creating and remembering individual and collections of 
passwords, and also if the concept of ‘belongingness’ coupled with socio-mapping 
has a role to play in creating and using unique, very secure passwords to highly 
sensitive services. 
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